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ABSTRACT
Recent research on reinforcement learning in pure-conflict and
pure-common interest games has emphasized the importance of
population heterogeneity. In contrast, studies of reinforcement
learning in mixed-motive games have primarily leveraged homo-
geneous approaches. Given the defining characteristic of mixed-
motive games—the imperfect correlation of incentives between
groupmembers—we study the effect of population heterogeneity on
mixed-motive reinforcement learning. We draw on interdependence
theory from social psychology and imbue reinforcement learning
agents with Social Value Orientation (SVO), a flexible formaliza-
tion of preferences over group outcome distributions. We subse-
quently explore the effects of diversity in SVO on populations of
reinforcement learning agents in two mixed-motive Markov games.
We demonstrate that heterogeneity in SVO generates meaningful
and complex behavioral variation among agents similar to that
suggested by interdependence theory. Empirical results in these
mixed-motive dilemmas suggest agents trained in heterogeneous
populations develop particularly generalized, high-performing poli-
cies relative to those trained in homogeneous populations.
1 INTRODUCTION
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the actions of one agent
can influence the experience and outcomes for other agents—that
is, agents are interdependent. Interdependent interactions can be
sorted into two categories based on the alignment of incentives for
the agents involved [47]:
(1) Pure-motive interactions, in which the group’s incentives are
either entirely aligned (pure-common interest) or entirely
opposed (pure-conflict),
(2) and mixed-motive interactions, in which the group’s incen-
tives are sometimes aligned and sometimes in conflict.1
Examples of the former include games such as Hanabi [6] and Go
[49]. The latter category is typified by games like the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [46, 53] and the tragedy of the commons [20, 31]. This
1When Schelling originally introduced the pure- and mixed-motive framework, he
explained, “Mixed-motive refers not, of course, to an individual’s lack of clarity about
his own preferences but rather to the ambivalence of his relation to the other player—
the mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of partnership and competition” [47].
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categorical distinction is especially relevant for spatially and tem-
porally extended Markov games. In these games, interdependence
emerges both as a direct impact of one agent’s actions on another’s
outcomes and as an indirect effect of each agent on the state of the
substrate environment in which others co-exist.
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Figure 1: Homogeneity and heterogeneity in population-
based multi-agent reinforcement learning. (a) Population
homogeneity and heterogeneity result in different training
experiences for a given agent i. In the homogeneous case,
agent policies are either identical or very similar (e.g., due
to identical training distributions or shared motivations).
In the heterogeneous setting, a given agent i encounters a
range of group compositions over time. The variability in
policies can stem fromagents training under different distri-
butions or with different motivations. (b) Representative ex-
amples of previous multi-agent reinforcement learning re-
search. We study the mixed-motive, heterogeneous setting.
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In pure-conflict reinforcement learning, self-play solutions for
Markov games [5, 22, 49] have gradually given way to population-
based approaches [26, 55] (Figure 1a). A central impetus for this
shift has been an interest in ensuring agent performance is robust
to opponent heterogeneity (i.e., variation in the set of potential
opponent policies). Similarly, recent work on pure-common inter-
est reinforcement learning in Markov games has highlighted the
importance of robustness to diverse partner policies [1, 11]. In both
of these contexts, it is desirable to train agents capable of adapting
and best responding to a wide range of potential policy sets.
In mixed-motive Markov games, the effects of partner hetero-
geneity have not received much attention. Most mixed-motive rein-
forcement learning research has produced policies through self-play
[32, 43] or co-training policies in fixed groups [24, 31]. Such meth-
ods foster homogeneity in the set of policies each agent encounters.
We aim to introduce policy heterogeneity into mixed-motive
reinforcement learning (Figure 1b). In recent years, a growing body
of work has explored the effects of furnishing agents in mixed-
motive games with various motivations such as inequity aversion
[24, 56], social imitation [15], and social influence [28]. Thus, a
natural starting point for the study of heterogeneity is to explore the
effects of diversity in intrinsic motivation [51]. Here we endow our
agents with Social Value Orientation (SVO), an intrinsic motivation
to prefer certain group reward distributions between self and others.
Psychology and economics research has repeatedly demonstrated
that human groups sustain high levels of cooperation across differ-
ent games through heterogeneous distributive preferences [7, 13,
16, 45, 50]. A particularly compelling account from interdependence
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Figure 2: Interdependence theory. The top pathway depicts
a transformation process for a row player who has altru-
istic preferences. In this case, the outcome transformation
directly transfers the column player’s payoff into the ef-
fective matrix. The bottom pathway shows a transforma-
tion process for a row player with competitive preferences,
who finds it rewarding to maximize the distance between
their payoff and the column player’s payoff. These two out-
come transformations suggest different dominant strategies
(highlighted in blue).
theory holds that humans deviate from game theoretic predictions
in economic games because each player acts not on the “given ma-
trix” of a game—which reflects the extrinsic payoffs set forth by the
game rules—but on an “effective matrix”, which represents the set
of outcomes as subjectively evaluated by that player [29]. Players
receive the given matrix from their environment and subsequently
apply an “outcome transformation” reflecting their individual pref-
erences for various outcome distributions. The combination of the
given matrix and the outcome transformation form the effective
matrix (Figure 2). Though an individual’s social preferences may de-
crease their given payoff in a single game, groups with diverse sets
of preferences are capable of resisting suboptimal Nash equilibria.
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, reward sharing is com-
monly used to resolve mixed-motive dilemmas [24, 44, 52, 56]. To
date, agent hyperparameters controlling reward mixture have typi-
cally been shared. This approach implies a homogeneous popula-
tion of policies, echoing the representative agent assumption from
economics [21, 30]. The continued reliance on shared reward mix-
tures is especially striking considering that the ability to capture
heterogeneity is a key strength of agent-based models over other
modeling approaches [19].
Homogeneous populations often fall prey to a peculiar variant
of the lazy agent problem [52], wherein one or more agents begin
ignoring the individual learning task at hand and instead optimize
for the shared reward [24]. These shared-reward agents shoulder
the burden of prosocial work, in a manner invariant to radical
shifts in group composition across episodes. This “specialization”
represents a failure of training to generate generalized policies.
To investigate the effects of heterogeneity in mixed-motive rein-
forcement learning, we introduce a novel, generalized mechanism
for reward sharing. We derive this reward-sharing mechanism, So-
cial Value Orientation (SVO), from studies of human cooperative be-
havior in social psychology. We show that across several games, het-
erogeneous distributions of these social preferences within groups
generate more generalized individual policies than do homoge-
neous distributions. We subsequently explore how heterogeneity in
SVO sustains positive group outcomes. In doing so, we demonstrate
that this formalization of social preferences leads agents to discover
specific prosocial behaviors relevant to each environment.
2 AGENTS
2.1 Multi-agent reinforcement learning and
Markov games
In this work, we consider n-player partially observable Markov
games. A partially observable Markov game M is defined on a
finite set of states S. The game is endowed with an observation
function O : S × {1, . . . ,n} → Rd ; a set of available actions for
each player, A1, . . . ,An ; and a stochastic transition function T :
S×A1×· · ·×An → ∆(S), which maps from the joint actions taken
by the n players to the set of discrete probability distributions over
states. From each state, players take a joint action ®a = (a1, . . . ,an ) ∈
A1, . . . ,An .
Each agent i independently experiences the environment and
learns a behavior policy π (ai |oi ) based on its own observation
oi = O(s, i) and (scalar) extrinsic reward ri (s, ®a). Each agent learns
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a policy which maximizes a long term γ -discounted payoff defined
as:
V ®πi (s0) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γ tUi (st , ®ot , ®at )| ®at ∼ ®πt , st+1 ∼ T(st , ®at )
]
(1)
where Ui (st , ®ot , ®at ) is a utility function and ®o = (o1, . . . ,on ) for
simplicity. In standard reinforcement learning, the utility function
maps directly to the extrinsic reward provided by the environment.
2.2 Social Value Orientation
Here we introduce Social Value Orientation (SVO), an intrinsic
motivation to prefer certain group reward distributions between
self and others.
We introduce the concept of a reward angle as a scalar represen-
tation of the observed distribution of reward between player i and
all other players in the group. The size of the angle formed by these
two scalars represents the relative distribution of reward between
self and others (Figure 3). Given a group of size n, its corresponding
reward vector is ®R = (r1, . . . , rn ). The reward angle for player i is:
θ ( ®R) = atan
(
r¯−i
ri
)
(2)
where r¯−i is a statistic summarizing the rewards of all other group
members. We choose the arithmetic mean r¯−i = 1n−1
∑
j,i r j [38].
Note that reward angles are invariant to the scalar magnitude of ®R.
The Social Value Orientation, θSVO, for player i is player i’s
target distribution of reward among group members. We use the
difference between the observed reward angle and the targeted SVO
to calculate an intrinsic reward. Combining this intrinsic reward
with the extrinsic reward signal from the environment, we can
define the following utility functionUi to be maximized in Eq. (1):
Ui (s,oi ,ai ) = ri −w · |θSVO − θ ( ®R)| (3)
where w is a weight term controlling the effect of Social Value
Orientation onUi .
In constructing this utility function, we follow a standard ap-
proach inmixed-motive reinforcement learning research [24, 28, 56]
which provides agents with an overall reward signal combining
extrinsic and intrinsic reward [51]. This approach parallels interde-
pendence theory, wherein the effective matrix is formed from the
combination of the given matrix and the outcome transformation,
and ultimately serves as the basis of actors’ decisions [29].
For the exploratory work we detail in the following sections,
we restrict our experiments to SVO in the non-negative quadrant
(all θ ∈ [0°, 90°]). The preference profiles in the non-negative quad-
rant provide the closest match to parameterizations in previous
multi-agent research on reward sharing. Nonetheless, we note that
interesting preference profiles exist throughout the entire ring [37].
2.3 Algorithm
We deploy advantage actor-critic (A2C) as the learning algorithm
for our agents [35]. A2C maintains both value (critic) and policy
(actor) estimates using a deep neural network. The policy is up-
dated according to the REINFORCE policy-gradient method, using a
value estimate as a baseline to reduce variance. Our neural network
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Figure 3: Reward angles and the ring formulation of Social
Value Orientation (SVO). Reward angles are a scalar repre-
sentation of the tradeoff between an agent’s own reward and
the reward of other agents in the environment. The reward
angle an agent prefers is its SVO.
comprises a convolutional layer, a feedforward module, an LSTM
with contrastive predictive coding [41], and linear readouts for pol-
icy and value. We apply temporal smoothing to observed rewards
within the model’s intrinsic motivation function, as described by
[24].
We use a distributed, asynchronous framework for training [56].
We train populations of N = 30 agents with policies {πi }. For each
population, we sample n = 5 players at a time to populate each of
100 arenas running in parallel (see also Figure 1a, in which arenas
are represented as “samples” from the agent population). Each arena
is an instantiation of a single episode of the environment. Within
each arena, the sampled agents play an episode of the environment,
after which a new group is sampled. Episode trajectories last 1000
steps and are written to queues for learning. Weights are updated
from queues using V-Trace [17].
3 MIXED-MOTIVE GAMES
3.1 Intertemporal social dilemmas
For our experiments, we consider two temporally and spatially
extended mixed-motive games played with group size n = 5: Har-
vestPatch and Cleanup. These two environments are intertemporal
social dilemmas, a particular class of mixed-motive Markov games
(c.f., [33]).
Intertemporal social dilemmas are group situationswhich present
a tension between short-term individual incentives and the long-
term collective interest [24]. Each individual has the option of
behaving prosocially (cooperation) or selfishly (defection). Though
unanimous cooperation generates welfare-maximizing outcomes
in the long term, on short timescales the personal benefits of acting
selfishly strictly dominate those of prosocial behavior. Thus, though
all members of the group prefer the rewards of mutual coopera-
tion, the intertemporal incentive structure pushes groups toward
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Figure 4: Screenshots of gameplay from (a) HarvestPatch and (b) Cleanup.
welfare-suppressing equilibria. Previous work has evaluated the
game theoretic properties of intertemporal social dilemmas [24].
3.2 HarvestPatch
HarvestPatch is a variant of the common-pool resource appro-
priation game Harvest [24] (Figure 4a). Players are rewarded for
collecting apples (reward +1) within a 24 × 26 gridworld environ-
ment. Apples regrow after being harvested at a rate dependent on
the number of unharvested apples within a regrowth radius of 3. If
there are no apples within its radius, an apple cannot regrow. At
the beginning of each episode, apples are probabilistically spawned
in a hex-like pattern of patches, such that each apple is within the
regrowth radius of all other apples in its patch and outside of the
regrowth radius of apples in all other patches. This creates localized
stock and flow properties [18] for each apple patch. Each patch is
irreversibly depleted when all of its apples have been harvested—
regardless of how many apples remain in other patches. Players
are also able to use a beam to punish other players (reward −50), at
a small cost to themselves (reward −1). This enables the possible
use of punishment to discourage free-riding [23, 40].
A group can achieve indefinite sustainable harvesting by ab-
staining from eating “endangered apples” (apples which are the last
unharvested apple remaining in their patch). However, the reward
for sustainable harvesting only manifests after a period of regrowth
if all players abstain. In contrast, an individual is immediately and
unilaterally guaranteed the reward for eating an endangered apple
if it acts greedily. This creates a dilemma juxtaposing the short-term
individual temptation to maximize reward through unsustainable
behavior and the long-term group interest of generating higher
reward by acting sustainably.
In HarvestPatch, episodes last 1000 steps. Each agent’s observ-
ability is limited to a 15 × 15 RGB window, centered on its current
location. The action space consists of movement, rotation, and use
of the punishment beam (8 actions total).
3.3 Cleanup
Cleanup [24] is a public goods game (Figure 4b). Players are again
rewarded for collecting apples (reward +1) within a 25 × 18 grid-
world environment. In Cleanup, apples grow in an orchard at a
rate inversely related to the cleanliness of a nearby river. The river
accumulates pollution with a constant probability over time. Be-
yond a certain threshold of pollution, the apple growth rate in the
orchard drops to zero. Players have an additional action allowing
them to clean a small amount of pollution from the river. How-
ever, the cleaning action only works on pollution within a small
distance in front of the agents, requiring them to physically leave
the apple orchard to clean the river. Thus, players maintain the
public good of orchard regrowth through effortful contributions.
As in HarvestPatch, players are able to use a beam to punish other
players (reward −50), at a small cost to themselves (reward −1).
A group can achieve continuous apple growth in the orchard
by keeping the pollution levels of the river consistently low over
time. However, on short timescales, each player would prefer to
collect apples in the orchard while other players provide the public
good in the river. This creates a tension between the short-term
individual incentive to maximize reward by staying in the orchard
and the long-term group interest of maintaining the public good
through sustained contributions over time.
Episodes last 1000 steps. Agent observability is again limited to
a 15 × 15 RGB window, centered on the agent’s current location. In
Cleanup, agents have an additional action for cleaning (9 actions
total).
4 RESULTS
4.1 Social diversity and agent generality
We began by training 12 homogeneous populations per task, with
N = 30: four consisting of individualistic agents (all θ = 0°), four
of prosocial agents (all θ = 45°), and four of altruistic agents (all
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a) b)
Figure 5: Episode rewards for homogeneous selfish popula-
tions playing (a) HarvestPatch and (b) Cleanup. Each indi-
vidual line shows a single agent’s return over training.
θ = 90°) agents. These resemble previous approaches using self-
ishness [42], inequity aversion [24, 56], and strong reward sharing
[44, 52], respectively. The population training curves for homoge-
neous selfish populations closely resembled group training curves
from previous studies [24, 42] (see sample population training
curves in Figure 5). In particular, performance in both environ-
ments generated negative returns at the beginning of training due
to high-frequency use of the punishment beam. Agents quickly
improved performance by learning not to punish one another, but
failed to learn cooperative policies. Ultimately, selfish agents were
unable to consistently avoid the tragedy of the commons in Har-
vestPatch or provide public goods in Cleanup.
Optimal hyperparameter values may vary between HarvestPatch
and Cleanup. Thus, we selected the weight values w for the two
tasks by conducting an initial sweep overw with homogeneous pop-
ulations of N = 20 altruistic agents (all θ = 90°). In HarvestPatch,
a weight w = 0.2 produced the highest collective returns across
several runs (Figure 6a). In Cleanup, a weight w = 0.1 produced
the highest collective returns across several runs (Figure 6b).
As expected, in HarvestPatch, the highest collective returns
among the homogeneous populations were achieved by the al-
truistic populations (Table 1, Homogeneous row). The prosocial
and individualistic populations performed substantially worse. In
Cleanup, the highest collective returns similarly emerged among
the altruistic populations. The populations of prosocial and individ-
ualistic agents, in contrast, achieved near-zero collective returns.
a) b)
Figure 6: Equilibrium collective return for homogeneous
populations of altruistic agents in (a) HarvestPatch and (b)
Cleanup. Closed dots reflect populations in which all agents
receive positive returns at equilibrium. Open dots indicate
populations in which some agents receive zero or negative
reward.
Mean SVO HarvestPatch Cleanup
Homogeneous
0° 587.6 (101.7) -9.9 (11.7)
45° 665.9 (52.4) 1.1 (2.1)
90° 1552.7 (248.2) 563.8 (235.2)
Heterogeneous
15° 553.4 (574.6) -0.1 (5.7)
30° 658.7 (107.1) 2.0 (2.4)
45° 764.1 (236.3) 6.3 (7.1)
60° 860.9 (121.5) 318.5 (335.0)
75° 1167.9 (232.6) 1938.5 (560.6)
Table 1: Mean collective returns achieved at equilibrium by
homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. Standard de-
viations are reported in parentheses.
We next trained 80 heterogeneous populations per task. To gen-
erate each heterogeneous population, we sampled N = 30 SVO
values from a normal distribution with a specified mean and disper-
sion. Since we treated SVO as a bounded variable for these initial
experiments, we selected five equally spaced values from 15° to 75°
to act as population means and and four equally spaced values from
5.6° ( π32 radians) to 11.3° (
π
16 radians) to act as population standard
deviations. For each mean-standard deviation pair, we generated
four populations using different random seeds. We used the same
weightsw as for the homogeneous populations.
Among the heterogeneous populations, we observed the highest
equilibrium collective returns among the 75° population (Table 1,
Heterogeneous row). In HarvestPatch, the performance of homo-
geneous altruistic populations outstripped the performance of the
75° populations. In Cleanup, the reverse pattern emerged: the high-
est collective returns among all populations are achieved by the
heterogeneous 75° populations.
We unexpectedly find that homogeneous populations of altru-
istic agents produced lower equality scores than most other ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous populations (Table 2). Homoge-
neous, altruistic populations earned relatively high collective re-
turns in both tasks. However, in each case the produced rewards
were concentrated in a small proportion of the population. Agents
Mean SVO HarvestPatch Cleanup
Homogeneous
0° 0.90 (0.09) 0.16 (0.09)
45° 0.97 (0.01) 0.54 (0.07)
90° 0.29 (0.03) 0.41 (0.08)
Heterogeneous
15° 0.90 (0.13) 0.34 (0.09)
30° 0.94 (0.06) 0.40 (0.09)
45° 0.95 (0.03) 0.38 (0.10)
60° 0.91 (0.02) 0.64 (0.21)
75° 0.76 (0.04) 0.87 (0.08)
Table 2: Mean equality scores achieved at equilibrium by ho-
mogeneous and heterogeneous populations. Equality is cal-
culated as the inverse Gini coefficient, with 0 representing
all reward being received by a single agent and 1 represent-
ing all agents receiving an identical positive reward. Stan-
dard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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a) b)
Figure 7: Equilibrium performance of homogeneous and
heterogeneous agent populations in HarvestPatch. (a) Het-
erogeneous populations enjoyed significantly higher me-
dian return at equilibrium. (b) Among heterogeneous pop-
ulations, the highest median returns emerged among the
populationswhose SVOdistributions have both a highmean
and a high standard deviation.
in these homogeneous populations appear to adopt a lazy-agent
approach [52] to resolve the conflict between the group’s shared
preferences for selfless reward distributions. To break the symmetry
of this dilemma, most agents in the population selflessly support
collective action, thereby optimizing for their social preferences. A
smaller number of agents then specialize in accepting the generated
reward—shouldering the “burden” of being selfish, in contravention
of their intrinsic preferences. This result highlights a drawback of
using collective return as a performance metric. Though collective
return is the traditional social outcome metric used in multi-agent
reinforcement learning, it can mask high levels of inequality.
We therefore revisited population performance by measuring
median return, which incorporates signal concerning the efficiency
and the equality of a group’s outcome distribution [8]. Median
return can help estimate the generality of learned policies within
homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. We compare median
return for the two population types bymeasuring the median return
for each population after it reaches equilibrium. We conduct a
Welch’s t-test and report the resulting t-statistic, degrees of freedom,
and p-value. We subsequently provide effect estimates (β) and p-
values from linear models regressing median return on the mean
and standard deviation of population SVO.
Figures 7 and 8 show the generality of policies trained in Harvest-
Patch and Cleanup, respectively. In HarvestPatch, heterogeneous
populations enjoyed significantly higher median return (µ = 27.8)
than homogeneous populations (µ = 15.8) at equilibrium, t(13.7) =
4.21,p < 0.001 (Figure 7a). Among heterogeneous populations, a
clear pattern could be observed: the higher the population mean
SVO, the higher the median return received (Figure 7b). Specifically
for populations with high mean SVO, median return appeared to
increase slightly when the SVO distribution was more dispersed.
When tested with a linear model regressing median return on the
mean and standard deviation of SVO, these trends primarily mani-
fested as an interaction effect between mean population SVO and
the standard deviation of population SVO, β = 0.025, p = 0.030. In
Cleanup, heterogeneous populations received significantly higher
a) b)
Figure 8: Equilibrium performance of homogeneous and
heterogeneous agent populations in Cleanup. (a) Heteroge-
neous populations received higher median return at equi-
librium. (b) Among heterogeneous populations, the highest
median returns emerged among the populations with a high
mean SVO.
median return (µ = 14.4) than homogeneous populations (µ = 4.2)
at equilibrium, t(35.9) = 2.43,p = 0.020 (Figure 8a). Among hetero-
geneous populations, the highest median returns were observed in
tandem with high mean SVO (Figure 8b). However, in this case the
effect of the interaction between mean SVO and standard deviation
of SVO was non-significant, p = 0.30.
In summary, our comparison of homogeneous and heteroge-
neous populations shows that populations of altruists performed
effectively in traditional terms (collective return). However, these
populations produced highly specialized agents, resulting in unde-
sirably low equality metrics. Populations with diverse SVO distribu-
tions were able to circumvent this symmetry-breaking problem and
achieve high levels of median return in HarvestPatch and Cleanup.
4.2 Social preferences and prosocial behavior
How exactly does the distribution of SVO help diverse popula-
tions resolve these social dilemmas? We next evaluated the behav-
ioral effects of SVO by examining a single, heterogeneous popula-
tion within each task. We randomly selected two populations that
a) b)
Figure 9: Correlation between target and observed reward
angles among SVO agents in (a) HarvestPatch and (b)
Cleanup. The higher an agent’s SVO, the higher the reward
angles it tended to observe.
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Figure 10: SVO and prosocial behavior in HarvestPatch.
Agents with higher SVOs were significantly more likely to
abstain from depleting local resource stocks. Here the yel-
low agent faces the choice of consuming an endangered ap-
ple for immediate reward or abstaining and traveling to a
different patch.
achieved high equilibrium performance during training, parame-
terized with mean SVOs of 75° and standard deviations of 7.5°. We
gathered data from 100 episodes of play for both of these evalu-
ation experiments, sampling 5 agents randomly for each episode.
All regressions reported in this section are mixed error-component
models, incorporating a random effect to account for the repeated
sampling of individual agents. The accompanying figures depict
average values per agent, with superimposed regression lines rep-
resenting the fixed effect estimate (β) of SVO.
In our evaluation experiments, we observed a positive relation-
ship between an agent’s target reward angle and the group reward
angles it tended to observe in HarvestPatch, β = 1.51, p < 0.001
(Figure 9a). The effect of SVO on observed reward angle was simi-
larly significant in Cleanup, β = 2.08, p < 0.001 (Figure 9b). This
reflects the association of higher agent SVO with the realization of
more-prosocial distributions. In both environments, the estimated
effect lies below the 45° line, indicating that agents acted somewhat
more selfishly than their SVO would suggest.
In HarvestPatch, an agent’s prosociality can be estimated by
measuring its abstention from consuming endangered apples. We
calculated abstention as an episode-level metric incorporating the
number of endangered apples an agent consumed and a normaliza-
tion factor encoding at what points in the episode the endangered
apples were consumed. An abstention score of 1 indicates that
an agent did not eat a single endangered apple (or that it ate one
or more endangered apples on the final step of the episode). An
abstention score of 0, though not technically achievable, would
indicate that an agent consumed one endangered apple from every
apple patch in the environment on the first step of the episode. We
observe a significant and positive relationship between an agent’s
SVO and its abstention, β = 0.0065, p = 0.006 (Figure 10).
The structure of the HarvestPatch environment creates localized
stock and flow components. Hosting too many agents in a single
patch threatens to quickly deplete the local resource pool. Thus,
one rule groups can use to maintain sustainability is for group
members to harvest in separate patches, rather than harvesting to-
gether and sequentially destroying the environment’s apple patches.
Figure 11: SVO and prosocial conventions in HarvestPatch.
The higher an agent’s SVO, the more distance it tended to
maintain from other agents in its environment. Here the
teal agent is maintaining a particularly high interagent dis-
tance, allowing it to sustainably harvest from a single patch.
We find that SVO correlated with distance maintained from other
group members, β = 0.005, p = 0.016 (Figure 11). Consequently,
groups with higher mean SVO established stronger conventions
of interagent distance. This simple behavioral convention helped
higher-SVO groups guard against environmental collapse.
In Cleanup, an agent’s prosociality can be estimated by measur-
ing the amount of pollution it cleans from the river. There was a
significant and positive relationship between an agent’s SVO and
the amount of pollution it cleaned, β = 1.68, p = 0.001 (Figure 12).
Agents with higher SVOs acted more prosocially by making greater
contributions to the public good.
Finally, do SVO agents develop any sort of prosocial conventions
in Cleanup to help maintain high levels of river cleanliness? In
Cleanup, we examined one potential coordinating convention that
we term behavioral preparedness: an inclination to transition from
harvesting to cleaning even before the orchard is fully depleted.
In Cleanup, groups that follow the short-term, individual-level
incentive structure will respond primarily to the depletion of the
Figure 12: SVO and prosocial behavior in Cleanup. Agents
with higher SVOs cleaned a significantly greater amount of
pollution per episode than did peers with low SVO. Here the
pink agent is actively cleaning two cells of pollution from
the river. The yellow agent is using its cleaning action out-
side of the river, which does not affect its contribution score.
AAMAS’20, May 2020, Auckland, New Zealand K. McKee et al.
Figure 13: SVO and prosocial conventions in HarvestPatch.
Agents with higher SVOs were significantly more likely to
enter the river while there were unharvested apples within
view. Here the magenta agent is transitioning to clean the
river, even though it can observe multiple unharvested ap-
ples in the orchard.
orchard, rather than acting preventatively to ensure the public
good is sustained over time. Groups that adopt welfare-maximizing
strategies, on the other hand, will not wait for the orchard to be
fully harvested to clean the river. We find a positive relationship
between the average number of apples observable to agents at
the times of their transitions to cleaning in each episode, β =
0.028, p < 0.001. The size and significance of this effect are not
meaningfully affected by controlling for the number of times each
agent transitioned to the river in a given episode, β = 0.028, p <
0.001 (Figure 13). In aggregate, this behavioral pattern helped high-
SVO groups maintain higher levels of orchard regrowth over time.
5 DISCUSSION
Recent research on pure-conflict and pure-cooperation reinforce-
ment learning has highlighted the importance of developing robust-
ness to diversity in opponent and partner policies [11, 26, 55]. We
extend this argument to the mixed-motive setting, focusing in par-
ticular on the effects of heterogeneity in social preferences. Drawing
from interdependence theory, we endow agents with Social Value
Orientation (SVO), a flexible formulation for reward sharing among
group members.
In the mixed-motive games considered here, homogeneous pop-
ulations of pure altruists achieved high collective returns. How-
ever, these populations tended to produce hyper-specialized agents
which reaped reward primarily from either intrinsic or extrinsic
motivation, rather than both—a method of breaking the symmetry
of the shared motivation structure. Thus, when equality-sensitive
metrics are considered, populations with diverse distributions of
SVO values were able to outperform homogeneous populations.
This pattern echoes the historic observation from interdepen-
dence theory that, if both players in a two-player matrix game adopt
a “maximize other’s outcome” transformation process, the resulting
effective matrices often produce deficient group outcomes:
“It must be noted first that, in a number of matrices with a
mutual interest in prosocial transformations, if one person acts
according to such a transformation, the other is better off by
acting according to his own given outcomes than by adopting a
similar transformation.” [29]
This quote highlights a striking parallel between our findings and
the predictions of interdependence theory. We believe this is in-
dicative of a broader overlap in perspective and interests between
multi-agent reinforcement learning and the social-behavioral sci-
ences. Here we capitalize on this overlap, drawing inspiration from
social psychology to formalize a general mechanism for reward
sharing. Moving forward, SVO agents can be leveraged as a model-
ing tool for social psychology research [36].
In this vein, group formation is a topic important to both fields. It
is well established among pyschologists that an individual’s behav-
ior is strongly guided by their ingroup—the group with which they
psychologically identify [14]. However, the processes by which
individuals form group identities are still being studied and inves-
tigated [10, 54]. What sort of mechanisms transform and redefine
self-interest to incorporate the interests of a broader group? This
line of inquiry has potential linkages to the study of team and
coalition formation in multi-agent research [48].
Our findings show that in multi-agent environments, heteroge-
neous distributions of SVO can generate high levels of population
performance. A natural question follows from these results: how
can we identify optimal SVO distributions for a given environment?
Evolutionary approaches to reinforcement learning [27] could be
applied to study the variation in optimal distributions of SVO across
individual environments. We note that our results mirror findings
from evolutionary biology that across-individual genetic diversity
can produce group-wide benefits [39]. We suspect that SVO agents
can be leveraged in simulo to study open questions concerning the
emergence and adaptiveness of human altruism [9, 34].
The development of human-compatible agents still faces major
challenges [2, 3, 25]. In pure-common interest reinforcement learn-
ing, robustness to partner heterogeneity is seen as an important step
toward human compatibility [11]. The same holds true for mixed-
motive contexts. Within “hybrid systems” containing humans and
artificial agents [12], agents should be able to predict and respond
to a range of potential partner behaviors. Social preferences are,
of course, an important determinant of human behavior [4, 29].
Endowing agents with SVO is a promising path forward for train-
ing diverse agent populations, expanding the capacity of agents
to adapt to human behavior, and fostering positive human-agent
interdependence.
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